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Introduction 
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his 
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the 
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal 
liberty and private property, where that right has never been 
forfeited by his conviction of some public offence . . . .2 
One evening, you are on your way home from work. You make 
your normal drive from your office to your house without any stops. 
A few days later, you receive a certified letter from the local police 
department informing you that you are a “person of interest” in a 
homicide investigation. The police request you to come to the 
station to be interviewed. The letter explains that law enforcement 
obtained your cell phone’s site location information (CSLI)3 from 
your cellular provider. Using your CSLI, as well as CSLI from 
other “persons of interest,” your phone’s data shows that you were 
in the vicinity of the homicide at the time it occurred.4 The letter 
                                                                                                     
 2. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
 3. See Case Comment, United States v. Graham: Fourth Circuit Holds That 
Acquisition of Historical Cell-Site Location Information Is Not a Search, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1273 (2017) [hereinafter Acquisition] (explaining that CSLI 
is “a carrier’s records of the cell tower used to route a user’s calls and messages” 
usually to the closest tower (citing United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 343 
(4th Cir. 2015))); see also Alexander Porter, “Time Works Changes”: Modernizing 
Fourth Amendment Law To Protect Cell Site Location Information, 57 B.C. L. REV. 
1781, 1798 (2016) (“Historical CSLI is data that the cellular service provider 
creates and keeps about the communication between an individual cell phone and 
the cellular network.” (citing Scott A. Fraser, Comment, Making Sense of New 
Technologies and Old Law: A New Proposal for Historical Cell-Site Location 
Jurisprudence, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 571, 574–75 (2012))). 
 4. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (explaining that law 
enforcement can use CSLI to “reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to 
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also claims that by signing up and using your cell phone provider’s 
service, you voluntarily consented to your provider releasing your 
cell phone tracking information to law enforcement. The police 
have conducted warrantless surveillance with no reasonable cause. 
The hypothetical above should frighten every smartphone 
user in the United States. It is estimated that in 2017, there are 
approximately 224,300,000 people using smartphones in the 
United States.5 Given the current state of technology and the law, 
the hypothetical could become a reality. Advances in technology 
allow smartphone location data to be determined more precisely.6 
Smartphones hold increasingly personalized and revealing 
information about their owners.7 Law enforcement also has access 
to increasingly sophisticated methods to acquire CSLI.8 
Meanwhile, the law has not kept up with technology or society’s 
                                                                                                     
the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building” with 
increasing accuracy (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring))). 
 5. See Number of smartphone users in the United States from 2010 to 2022 
(in millions), STATISTA (2017), https://www.statista.com/statistics/201182/forecast 
-of-smartphone-users-in-the-us/ (displaying the number of smartphone users in 
the United States from data gathered between 2010 and 2016 and projecting that 
consumer smartphone use in the United States will continue to increase) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also 
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (“[M]any of the more than 90% of American adults who 
own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of 
their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.” (citing City of Ontario v. Quon, 
560 U. S. 746, 760 (2010))); see also Jacob Poushter, Smartphone Ownership and 
Internet Usage Continues to Climb in Emerging Economies, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 
22, 2016), http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/02/22/smartphone-ownership-and-
internet-usage-continues-to-in-emerging-economies/ (stating that 2015 research 
indicates 72% of people over eighteen years of age in the United States own a 
smartphone) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 6. See Craig Silliman, Technology and Shifting Privacy Expectations 
(Perspective), BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/technology-and-
shifting-privacy-expectations-perspective/ (“[C]hanges—particularly, the surge in 
our customers’ use of data and the fact that many of today’s cell sites have smaller 
ranges—mean that our network now collects more voluminous and more precise 
location information . . . .”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 7. See id. (explaining how the current technological capabilities of everyday 
technology such as a cell phone create Fourth Amendment concerns). 
 8. See id. (describing the process used by wireless networks to capture 
CSLI). 
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reasonable expectations of privacy.9 The legal standards for the 
government to obtain cell phone tracking data are inconsistent and 
often unclear.10 The ability of law enforcement agencies to obtain 
this type of personal information often without a warrant impacts 
all smartphone users and raises serious Fourth Amendment 
privacy concerns.11  
In some jurisdictions, real-time tracking of a cell phone’s 
location does require a warrant.12 As of February of 2017, however, 
several federal circuit courts have held that law enforcement may 
routinely obtain CSLI without a probable cause warrant.13 The 
                                                                                                     
 9. See id. (suggesting that U.S. Supreme Court precedent from the 1970s 
may not be applicable today “when [a customer] reveal[s] location information to 
[the] carrier simply because [the] device is connected to its network”). 
 10. See id. (noting that while some jurisdictions require law enforcement to 
obtain historical location information through a probable cause warrant, which 
imposes a significant burden on the government, “[m]ost courts have held that a 
court order is sufficient”). 
 11. See id. (describing how courts struggle when applying the third-party 
doctrine to advancing technology). 
 12. See Robinson Meyer, This Very Common Cellphone Surveillance Still 
Doesn’t Require a Warrant, ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.theatlantic. 
com/technology/archive/2016/04/sixth-circuit-cellphone-tracking-csli-warrant/47 
8197/ (discussing different warrant requirements between real-time CSLI and 
historic CSLI) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3 (2015) (enacted as a companion 
statute to the Stored Communications Act 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (1986) and 
requiring the government to obtain real-time CSLI). 
 13. See Porter, supra note 3, at 1782 (explaining that “[f]ive Federal Courts 
of Appeals covering more than 155 million Americans have approved the 
acquisition of historical CSLI by law enforcement” on less than probable cause, 
using instead a “specific and articulable facts standard”). However, many scholars 
argue that for cases involving historical CSLI, the government should be required 
to meet a higher standard that requires a probable cause warrant. See Brian L. 
Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government’s Use of Cell 
Tower Dumps in Its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 37–38 (2013) 
(referencing court opinions that support the application of a probable cause 
standard due to the breadth and intrusiveness of electronic surveillance using 
cell-site-location records); see also Patrick T. Chamberlain, Note, Court Ordered 
Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location Information: The Argument for a 
Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745, 1751 (2009) (arguing 
that a probable cause standard should govern disclosure of historical CSLI, and 
not “some lesser standard,” because it will likely be obtained more frequently by 
federal agents than real-time CSLI); see also Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location 
Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 
681, 742–43 (2011) (stating that “acquisition [of historical CSLI] by law 
enforcement should proceed only after agents obtain a warrant based on probable 
cause” because “its acquisition implicates a reasonable expectation of privacy”). 
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legal doctrine used to justify these warrantless searches is known 
as the “third-party doctrine.”14  
Like our hypothetical, the third-party doctrine justifies 
warrantless searches of a consumer’s historical CSLI under the 
theory that the consumer has “voluntarily” given consent to his 
carrier to disclose cell phone tracking information to third 
parties.15 The logic behind the doctrine is that since the consumer 
has consented in the agreement with the provider, the consumer 
lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy of the CSLI regardless 
how much or what type of information is revealed.16 The doctrine 
was first established in the 1970’s when particular technology 
involving the spread of consumer-based microprocessors and 
sensors was much less ubiquitous than it is in 2017.17 As a result, 
consumers’ expectations of privacy have likely changed 
dramatically.18 Therefore, the third-party doctrine “does not 
accurately estimate what society today would consider 
reasonable.”19  
Courts have struggled to apply this dated and static doctrine 
in a world of ever-changing technology.20 This struggle will only 
become more difficult as technology continues to evolve.21 Several 
                                                                                                     
 14. See Monu Bedi, The Curious Case of Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth 
Amendment Doctrine Mash-Up, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 507, 511 (2016) (describing 
the Fourth Amendment roots of the third-party doctrine and the problems this 
doctrine creates as technology evolves). 
 15. See Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth 
Amendment and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 489, 506 (2012) (discussing how the element of voluntary disclosure in the 
third-party doctrine precludes a court from characterizing the government’s 
acquisition of such disclosed information as a “search”). 
 16. See Silliman, supra note 6 (stating that new technology may change 
society’s reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 17. See David Oscar Markus & Nathan Freed Wessler, That ‘70s Show: Why 
the 11th Circuit Was Wrong to Rely on Cases from the 1970s to Decide a Cell-Phone 
Tracking Case, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1179, 1181 (2016) (discussing how courts 
should not apply old privacy doctrines to modern technology). 
 18. See id. at 1205 (“Recent data shows that more than 80 percent of people 
consider ‘[d]etails of [their] physical location over time’ to be ‘sensitive’--evincing 
greater concern for this data . . . .”). 
 19. Acquisition, supra note 3, at 1273. 
 20. See Silliman, supra note 6 (explaining that courts are struggling to apply 
static law to rapidly advancing technology in Fourth Amendment cases). 
 21. See Markus & Wessler, supra note 17, at 1193–94 (2016) (analyzing how 
courts rely on old pre-digital precedent to reach different conclusions). 
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recent United States Supreme Court cases suggest that the third-
party doctrine should be modernized.22 Questions remain about 
how the doctrine should be updated and whether the courts or the 
legislature should decide this issue.  
This Note is divided into three parts. Part I describes the birth 
and evolution of the third-party doctrine including informants, 
controversial pen registers, and the current complexity of location-
based tracking technology. Part II examines the current conflict 
between courts’ application of the third-party doctrine and citizens’ 
reasonable expectations of privacy. Finally, Part III considers 
possible solutions to the third-party doctrine quagmire. 
Ultimately, this Note proposes that the current third-party 
doctrine should be interpreted to require the government to obtain 
a probable cause warrant to collect real-time and historical CSLI.  
I. The Evolution of the Third-Party Doctrine: From Informants to 
Modern Cell Phone Tracking 
In 1942, United States Supreme Court Justice Murphy opined 
that “science has brought forth far more effective devices for the 
invasion of a person’s privacy than the direct and obvious methods 
of oppression which were detested by our forebears . . . .”23 A brief 
history of Fourth Amendment protections involving advancing 
technology is essential to understand the current state of the third-
party doctrine.  
                                                                                                     
 22. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. 
concurring) (“[The third-party doctrine] is ill suited to the digital age, in which 
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the 
course of carrying out mundane tasks.”); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
2473, 2495 (2014) (“Our answer to the question of what police must do before 
searching [information on] a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly 
simple—get a warrant.”); see also United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 437 
(4th Cir. 2016) (“A per se rule that it is unreasonable to expect privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties seems unmoored from current 
understandings of privacy.”). 
 23. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting). 
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A. Fourth Amendment Protections 
1. Wiretapping 
The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.24  
Since 1877, the United States Supreme Court has recognized 
this protection and has applied it to privacy matters.25 The notion 
of privacy has evolved considerably since 1877. As Michael Price 
explains, the Supreme Court “could afford to be technology-blind”26 
until 1928 when it heard the case of Olmstead v. United States.27 
In Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft explained that in attempting to 
gather evidence of a conspiracy, law enforcement inserted wires in 
telephone lines “without trespass[ing] upon any property of the 
defendants.”28 Collecting evidence through these wiretaps 
“continued for many months.”29  
Analyzing wiretapping in the light of Fourth Amendment 
privacy concerns, the Court explained that Fourth Amendment 
protections are only implicated by an “official search and seizure 
of his [a defendant’s] person, or such a seizure of his papers or his 
                                                                                                     
 24. U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 25. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 735 (1877) (explaining that the Fourth 
Amendment protects privacy rights by requiring a warrant to open letters and 
sealed postal packages); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967) 
(stating that the Constitution protects a citizen’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy). 
 26. See Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” 
and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247, 259 (2016) 
(detailing the evolution of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Fourth Amendment 
privacy cases). 
 27. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that 
wiretapping “did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment”). 
 28. See id. at 457 (describing how federal prohibition officers seized 
information about the defendants’ conspiracy “by intercepting messages on the 
telephones of the conspirators” without physically invading their property). 
 29. Id. 
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tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his 
house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.”30 Under 
the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court held that 
warrantless wiretapping was constitutional.31  
Price explains that because the Court in Olmstead relied on 
property law, it did not focus on the role technology played in 
society.32 Illustrating Price’s criticism, Justice Taft stated that in 
the context of wiretapping, “intervening wires are not part of his 
house or office any more than they are the highways along which 
they are stretched.”33 Notably, Justice Brandeis offered a dissent 
stating:  
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with 
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways 
may some day be developed by which the Government, without 
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in 
court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the 
most intimate occurrences of the home.34 
Extending its reasoning from Olmstead, the Court held in the 
1942 case of United States v. Goldman35 that federal agents using 
a “detectaphone” placed on the side of a wall to hear and 
transcribe a conversation between defendants was “not a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.”36  
Both Olmsted and Goldman “were products of the Court’s 
failure to give weight to new technology and the way it functions 
in society.”37 Even with the spread of and reliance on technology in 
society, the Supreme Court continued to emphasize that the 
                                                                                                     
 30. See id. at 467 (explaining the circumstances necessary to invoke the 
protections offered by the Fourth Amendment). 
 31. See id. at 466 (determining that the government’s wiretapping did not 
give rise to Fourth Amendment protections for the defendants). 
 32. See Price, supra note 26, at 267 (examining how the Supreme Court 
initially analyzed Fourth Amendment concerns about new technology in society). 
 33. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928). 
 34. Id. at 474. 
 35. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
 36. See id. at 131 (explaining that a detectaphone is a “listening apparatus” 
with earphones that allow law enforcement officers to hear the defendant through 
the wall). 
 37. Price, supra note 26, at 260. 
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Fourth Amendment’s protection extends primarily to physical 
trespasses.38 While the development of privacy protections under 
the Fourth Amendment continued, the Court was slow to depart 
from this trespass analysis.39 
2. Informants and “False Friends” 
In addition to analyzing Fourth Amendment cases through the 
lens of a physical trespass requirement, the Court also emphasized 
that generally, information revealed to third parties lacked 
sufficient Fourth Amendment protections.40 In the 1952 case, On 
Lee v. United States,41 the Court famously allowed law 
enforcement to submit evidence obtained from “informers, 
accessories, accomplices, [and] false friends” without violating the 
Fourth Amendment.42 The Court explained that a defendant may 
still be implicated in a crime when she discusses her involvement 
in or knowledge of criminal activity with a government 
informant.43 The fact that the defendant does not know the identity 
of the informant does not shield the defendant from liability.44 
                                                                                                     
 38. See id. (noting that following Goldman in 1942, the Supreme Court did 
not make a “shift away from the traditional concepts of property and trespass that 
had long dominated its jurisprudence” until 1967, when the Court “declar[ed] that 
the Fourth Amendment ‘protects people, not places’” (citing Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967))). 
 39. See Ryan Merkel, Playing Hide and Seek with Big Brother: Law 
Enforcement’s Use of Historical and Real Time Mobile Device Data, 35 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 429, 439–40 (noting the Supreme Court’s discussion of the trespass 
doctrine in recent location tracking technology cases). 
 40. See Rothstein, supra note 15, at 506–11 (discussing the Fourth 
Amendment search cases that helped establish the third-party doctrine). 
 41. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952) (finding no 
violation of the Fourth Amendment where an undercover federal agent entered 
the defendant’s place of business with consent and used a radio to transmit self-
incriminating statements made by the defendant to another federal agent who 
was stationed outside the defendant’s place of business). 
 42. See id. at 757 (“We cannot say that testimony such as this shall, as a 
matter of law, be refused all hearing.”). 
 43. See id. at 757–58 (stating that the informant’s credibility may be 
attacked in court, but the court should admit evidence of the defendant’s 
conversation with the informant). 
 44. See id. (suggesting that courts should not exclude testimony of 
“informers” or “false friends”). 
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To do otherwise would “arbitrarily” penalize the government’s 
case, because of the “low morals of its informers.”45 Continuing its 
analysis, the Court explained that while an informant’s credibility 
may be attacked and questioned in court, evidence obtained from 
an informant should not be excluded.46 The On Lee Court further 
reasoned that revealing information to individuals contains a risk 
that the receiver of the information may go to the police.47  
3. Katz and the Legal Framework for the Third-Party Doctrine 
As the Court continued to use the 1952 reasoning of On Lee to 
justify informant evidence, technology continued to advance. 
Finally, in 1967, the Court appeared to embrace Justice Brandeis’s 
Olmstead dissent.48 In the case of Katz v. United States,49 the Court 
departed from the traditional application of the Fourth 
Amendment search analysis which had focused on the notion of 
physical trespass. Katz helped established the framework for the 
third-party doctrine.50 The Court seemed to acknowledge emerging 
technology and society’s expectation of privacy.51  
In Katz,52 the defendant was convicted of transmitting 
“wagering information” over a telephone from Los Angeles to 
                                                                                                     
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. (asserting that the testimony of government informants should 
be challenged using the traditional evidentiary canons such as relevance and 
credibility and should not be automatically excluded from trial). 
 47. See Price, supra note 26, at 266–67 (explaining how courts use 
assumption of the risk analysis in Fourth Amendment privacy cases). 
 48. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government 
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the 
citizen.”). 
 49. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (shifting from the 
traditional Fourth Amendment search analysis which had focused on physical 
trespass). 
 50. See id. at 353 (refusing to follow previous precedent which emphasized 
physical trespass to establish Fourth Amendment protections).  
 51. See id. (concluding that “[t]he [g]overnment’s activities in electronically 
listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which 
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth”). 
 52. Id. 
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Miami and Boston.53 Katz argued that the government violated his 
Fourth Amendment protections because FBI agents “attached an 
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public 
telephone booth from which he [Katz] had placed his calls” to 
conduct his wagering business.54 Initially, the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit continued the traditional analytical framework 
by emphasizing that there should be a trespass and physical 
seizure before recognizing a Fourth Amendment violation.55 As a 
result, the Court of Appeals affirmed Katz’s conviction and stated 
that his Constitutional protections were not violated.56  
On appeal, the Supreme Court modified its traditional Fourth 
Amendment analytical emphasis on whether there was a physical 
trespass.57 Instead, the Court acknowledged that: 
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. 
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.58  
Reversing Katz’s conviction, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
the Constitution protects “people, not places.”59 The Court stated 
that the Fourth Amendment does not require a “technical trespass 
under . . . property law” before a Constitutional protection can be 
violated.60 Distinguishing Olmstead, which relied on the need for 
a physical trespass and seizure of material before Fourth 
Amendment protections were violated, the Court stated that “we 
have since departed from the narrow view on which that decision 
                                                                                                     
 53. Id. at 348. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. (using precedent based on property law to determine if there was 
a Fourth Amendment violation). 
 56. See Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134–35 (9th Cir. 1966) 
(affirming defendant’s conviction primarily because there was no “physical 
entrance into the area occupied” by the defendant). 
 57. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (refusing to follow 
previous precedent which emphasized physical trespass to establish Fourth 
Amendment protections). 
 58. Id. at 351 (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 
(1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927); Rios v. United States, 364 
U.S. 253 (1960); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 353 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
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[Olmstead] rested.”61 As a result, the Court altered its previous 
jurisprudential reliance on trespass law and held that the Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections against unreasonable searches 
and seizures applied in a case involving the use of a telephone 
booth.62  
As Justice Harlan noted in his concurring opinion, a question 
remained: if the Constitution protects people and not physical 
places, how will the Court analyze this protection?63 Justice 
Harlan outlined what became known as the Katz two-prong 
privacy test: first, whether “a person ha[s] exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.”64 Under the Katz test, Justice Harlan stated that the 
defendant had a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation 
of privacy” inside the telephone booth, and law enforcement 
violated this expectation.65  
4. Bank Records in United States v. Miller and Pen Registers in 
Smith v. Maryland 
After Justice Harlan’s Katz test, the Supreme Court 
considered two cases in the 1970’s that were essential to 
establishing the third-party doctrine.66 In 1976, the Supreme 
Court examined how the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections 
applied to a customer’s bank deposit slips, checks, and financial 
records in the case of United States v. Miller.67 While Miller 
                                                                                                     
 61. Id. at 353. 
 62. See id. at 359 (“Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he 
will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
 63. See id. at 361–62 (Harlan, J., concurring) (suggesting that courts may 
need more of a clear standard to analyze Fourth Amendment claims with new 
technology). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 360–61.  
 66. See Markus & Wessler, supra note 17, at 1180–81 (explaining that the 
modern-day test courts use to evaluate Fourth Amendment privacy claims was 
created primarily in the 1970’s). 
 67. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436–38 (1976) (explaining that 
the bank ordering employees to make defendant’s bank records available to police 
did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation). 
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claimed that he disclosed the bank records to his bank “for a 
limited purpose” and therefore he retained an expectation of 
privacy under the first prong of the Katz test, the Court rejected 
his assertion.68 Instead, the Court stated that “[w]e must examine 
the nature of the particular documents sought to be protected in 
order to determine whether there is a legitimate ‘expectation of 
privacy’ concerning their contents.”69  
Examining Miller’s deposit slips, checks, and financial 
documents, the Court concluded that there was “no legitimate 
‘expectation of privacy’” because all the documents were either “not 
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be 
used in commercial transactions” or “contain[ed] only information 
voluntarily conveyed to the banks” in the ordinary course of 
business.70  
Interestingly, some scholars suggest that the nature of the 
documents played a role in the Court’s analysis,71 as follows: 
The Court found it significant that the documents in question 
were not sensitive in nature or shared with the intent that they 
stay private; rather, they were commercial instruments any 
employee could see. That, rather than their third-party nature, 
was why Miller—and by extension society—could not 
legitimately expect privacy in them.72 
Furthermore, the Court explained that “[t]he depositor takes the 
risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will 
be conveyed by that person to the Government.”73  
                                                                                                     
 68. See id. at 442–43 (stating that Court has examined the nature of the 
documents and acknowledged that the depositor assumes the risk that this 
information may be revealed to police). 
 69. See id. at 442 (affirming the defendant’s conviction by using information 
about the defendant that the police obtained from the bank (citing Couch v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973))). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Acquisition, supra note 3, at 1277; see generally Jack M. Balkin, 
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 
1230–31 (2016) (discussing the modern version of this analysis and the 
interaction between informational fiduciaries and the Fourth Amendment).  
 72. Id. at 1277. 
 73. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 443 (1976) (citing United States v. 
White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971)). 
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Not all the Justices in Miller agreed.74 Foreshadowing the 
same issue that would arise when modern-day consumers sign up 
for cell phone service, Justice Brennan noted that the disclosure of 
information to a bank is “not entirely volitional, since it is 
impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary 
society without maintaining a bank account.”75 Critically, he 
warned that the majority’s reasoning and decision to allow third 
parties access to a citizen’s sensitive and personal information 
without a search warrant may create serious Fourth Amendment 
concerns.76 As Justice Brennan noted:  
To permit a police officer access to these records merely upon 
his request, without any judicial control as to relevancy or other 
traditional requirements of legal process, and to allow the 
evidence to be used in any subsequent criminal prosecution 
against a defendant, opens the door to a vast and unlimited 
range of very real abuses of police power.77 
Three years after Miller, the Supreme Court examined 
whether law enforcement violated a defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment protections by installing, without a warrant, a “pen 
register”78 at a telephone company to determine which numbers a 
defendant was dialing from his private telephone line.79 In Smith 
v. Maryland80 the Court concluded that “no warrant was 
required.”81 The Court explained that Smith used the phone and 
“voluntarily conveyed” his information to the phone company.82 As 
a result, he “assumed the risk” that his information would be 
revealed to police.83Furthermore, the Court explained that Miller 
                                                                                                     
 74. See id. at 455 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I wash my hands of today’s 
extended redundancy by the Court.”). 
 75. Id. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979) (explaining that a 
pen register is a mechanical device that records the telephone numbers dialed 
from the petitioner’s home without overhearing the conversations). 
 79. See id. at 736 (“This case presents the question whether the installation 
and use of a pen register constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment . . . .”). 
 80. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 81. Id. at 746. 
 82. Id. at 744. 
 83. Id.  
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had “no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he 
dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation was not 
‘legitimate.’”84 The Court also emphasized that this expectation 
was “not one that society [was] prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”85 Finally, the majority opinion stated that these pen 
registers “do not acquire contents of communication.”86  
Again, the Court was split.87 Justices Brennan, Stewart, and 
Marshall dissented.88 Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan 
recognized a principle that would apply to future cell phone 
customers, explaining that “it is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in 
contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic 
alternative” to using the technology in question.89 Recognizing the 
prevalence of technology in society in 1979, the dissent stated that 
“unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has 
become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but 
accept the risk of surveillance.”90 
Importantly, Justice Stewart’s dissent suggested that 
although the phone numbers dialed from a private line may be 
more “prosaic” than the actual phone conversation, they are “not 
without content.”91 Justice Marshall’s dissent noted that, without 
a search warrant, innocent people with nothing to hide could be 
negatively affected.92 For example, “[m]any individuals, including 
members of unpopular political organizations or journalists with 
confidential sources, may legitimately wish to avoid disclosure of 
their personal contacts.”93 The dissent explained that to allow: 
                                                                                                     
 84. Id. at 745. 
 85. See id. at 743–46 (explaining that society did not have this expectation 
of privacy (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring))). 
 86. Id. at 741. 
 87. See id. at 736–52 (demonstrating the divergence of views on this point). 
 88. Id. at 746–52. 
 89. Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 750 (citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465–66 (1963)). 
 91. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 92. See id. at 751–52 (warning that government intrusion into personal 
information without a probable cause warrant may raise significant and 
unintended Fourth Amendment concerns). 
 93. Id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972)). 
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[G]overnmental access to telephone records on less than 
probable cause may thus impede certain forms of political 
affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of a 
truly free society. Particularly given the Government’s previous 
reliance on warrantless telephonic surveillance to trace 
reporters’ sources and monitor protected political activity, I 
[Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan] am unwilling to 
insulate use of pen registers from independent judicial review.94  
Because these privacy interests are significant, the dissent argued 
that law enforcement should be “require[d]” to obtain a warrant 
before seeking customers’ information from the telephone 
companies .95  
B. Fourth Amendment Privacy Issues and Modern Technology 
These two cases from the 1970’s, Miller and Smith,96 helped 
create the framework for Fourth Amendment privacy analysis that 
courts still apply today.97 While the legal analysis has not changed, 
technology has. As modern cell phones and other technologies have 
evolved, lower courts have struggled with the application of the 
third-party doctrine and the Supreme Court has generally “stayed 
out” of modern electronic surveillance.98 Noting this dichotomy 
between the older legal doctrine and modern technology, the 
Supreme Court has issued several recent decisions that suggest a 
“new way forward.”99  
1. GPS in United States v. Jones 
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court signaled that courts 
may need guidance in applying the third-party doctrine to new 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 96. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735 (1979). 
 97. See Markus & Wessler, supra note 17, at 1181 (discussing the current 
technologies available when the third-party doctrine originated). 
 98. Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communication Privacy, 2007 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 3 (2007). 
 99. See Price, supra note 26, at 247 (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 
(2014); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)). 
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technology, especially with regard to society’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.100 In United States v. Jones,101 government 
officials obtained a warrant to install a GPS tracking device under 
the defendant’s car within ten days inside of the District of 
Columbia. Eleven days after the issuance of the warrant, officers 
installed the GPS device on Jones’ car while in a parking lot in 
Maryland.102 Law enforcement tracked “the vehicle’s movements 
for 28 days.”103 The Court unanimously held, with two 
concurrences, that the tracking was an unlawful trespass and 
constituted a prohibited Fourth Amendment search.104  
While Jones did not involve a third-party dispute such as those 
in Miller and Smith,105 the two concurrences in Jones offer 
significant insights into possible ways of modernizing the third-
party doctrine.106 In her concurrence, believing that trespass could 
serve as a floor instead of a ceiling for privacy interests, Justice 
Sotomayor backed Justice Scalia and asserted that the Jones case 
demonstrated the need to consider society’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the government’s use of location-based tracking 
technology.107 Justice Sotomayor stated that a “Fourth 
Amendment search occurs when the government violates a 
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as 
reasonable.”108 She warned that “[w]ith increasing regularity, the 
government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring 
                                                                                                     
 100. See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. at 948 (“On the 11th day, and not in the District of Columbia but 
in Maryland, agents installed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of the 
Jeep while it was parked in a public parking lot.”). 
 103. Id. at 946. 
 104. See id. at 947 (discussing the history of Fourth Amendment violations 
and emphasizing the trespass doctrine). 
 105. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that a phone 
company’s use of a pen register to record phone numbers dialed from the suspect’s 
home upon police request did not constitute a “search” requiring a warrant under 
the Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) 
(expressing the view that the Fourth Amendment does not bar the acquisition of 
information provided to a third-party by subpoena). 
 106. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (emphasizing the privacy implications associated with Fourth 
Amendment searches). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 954–55. 
188 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 171 (2017) 
undertaken in this case by enlisting factory or owner-installed 
vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.”109 
Knowledge of such GPS tracking “chills associational and 
expressive freedoms.”110  
While Justice Sotomayor’s statements are arguably dicta, her 
recognition of the speed with which technology is changing and 
society’s increasing expectations of privacy are directly relevant to 
the need for an updated analysis of the third-party doctrine in the 
context of obtaining cell phone location data.111 While Jones was 
not a per se third-party doctrine case, Justice Sotomayor’s five-
page concurrence discussing the need for change to the third-party 
doctrine is significant. Her concurrence may mean the Supreme 
Court is willing to consider updating the doctrine in the 
appropriate case. Justice Sotomayor even seemed to signal that 
change could be imminent, writing, “it may be necessary to 
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties.”112  
Similarly, Justice Alito filed a concurrence which Justice 
Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan joined.113 Justice 
Alito opined that the majority’s opinion was “highly artificial” 
because it relies on eighteenth century tort law.114 Instead, Jones 
presented the question of “whether respondent’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring 
of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”115 Justice Alito accepted 
the US v. Knotts116 decision, which stated that a beeper placed in 
a container to track the defendant’s movements was constitutional 
because the defendant was traveling on public roads.117 Justice 
                                                                                                     
 109. See id. at 955 (citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 
1125 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)). 
 110. Id. at 956. 
 111. Id. at 957. 
 112. Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)). 
 113. See id. at 964 (“I conclude that the lengthy monitoring that occurred in 
this case constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 114. Id. at 958. 
 115. Id. at 957–58. 
 116. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 117. See id. at 282 (discussing how traveling on public roads impacts certain 
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Alito also noted that monitoring a defendant without a warrant 
should be limited.118 While Jones held that monitoring the 
defendant’s movements for four weeks was considered a Fourth 
Amendment search, Justice Alito suggested: 
The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS 
tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that 
a reasonable person would not have anticipated. Under this 
approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s 
movements on public streets accords with expectations of 
privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.119 
Justice Alito’s approach also suggests that “the Katz test rests 
on the assumption that the hypothetical reasonable person has a 
well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations.”120 A person 
may have “a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. 
But technology can change those expectations.”121 As a result, he 
appears to suggest use of a balancing test, developed by the 
legislature, which would weigh the public interest against privacy 
concerns.122 
In support of his suggestion, Alito notes that after Katz, 
instead of leaving the complex issue of wiretapping to the courts, 
Congress passed a federal wiretapping statute, 18 U.S.C.S. 
§ 2510.123 As with wiretapping, GPS tracking technology can also 
be intrusive and presents significant privacy concerns. Like cell 
phone tracking, GPS tracking can create an accurate and detailed 
                                                                                                     
Fourth Amendment protection analysis). 
 118. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (2012) (explaining the 
precision of advanced location tracking technology and arguing that “lengthy 
monitoring” of defendant’s movements through GPS technology implicates 
Fourth Amendment protections). 
 119. Id. at 964 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. (stating that perhaps the Fourth Amendment protections could 
be safeguarded while allowing police to use this advanced technology by balancing 
the public safety with the individual’s privacy). 
 123. See id. at 963 (“After Katz, Congress did not leave it to the courts to 
develop a body of Fourth Amendment case law governing that complex subject. 
Instead, Congress promptly enacted a comprehensive statute . . . since that time, 
the regulation of wiretapping has been governed primarily by statute.”). 
190 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 171 (2017) 
record of a person’s daily activities and impact privacy 
expectations:  
On toll roads, automatic toll collection systems create a precise 
record of the movements of motorists who choose to make use of 
that convenience. Many motorists purchase cars that are 
equipped with devices that permit a central station to ascertain 
the car’s location at any time so that roadside assistance may 
be provided if needed and the car may be found if it is stolen.124  
Obtaining tracking information through toll road collection 
systems or new car location devices, can “shape the average 
person’s expectations”125 of privacy. Thus, Justice Alito warned 
that the use of longer-term tracking “impinges on the expectation 
of privacy”126 in society. 
While the Jones Court concluded that the government’s 
actions constituted a Fourth Amendment search, the Court did not 
define a bright-line test for determining an appropriate amount of 
time a defendant may be monitored without implicating 
constitutional protections.127 Justice Alito’s concurrence, which 
stated that only “relatively short-term monitoring”128 may not 
constitute a search, provides guidance for determining if a Fourth 
Amendment violation has occurred in situations involving the 
latest technology.129  
2. Cell Phones in Riley v. California 
In the 2014 case of Riley v. California,130 the Supreme Court 
required police to obtain a detailed search warrant specifying 
which parts of a cell phone they intended to search.131 The Court 
                                                                                                     
 124. Id. at 963. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 964. 
 127. See id. at 950 (describing when a citizen’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy is violated but not listing a definitive test applicable to this new 
technology). 
 128. Id. at 964. 
 129. See id. at 963 (stating that lengthy monitoring may conflict with modern 
notions of privacy because of the relative ease and breadth of technological 
snooping). 
 130. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 131. See id. at 2478 (discussing the risks associated with allowing police to 
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explained that a heightened expectation of privacy was applicable 
because of the personalized nature of cell phones.132 Cell phones 
are “minicomputers” because of the amount and detailed 
information they contain.133 Modern cell phones, the Court stated, 
“could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, 
calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, 
maps, or newspapers.”134 Because cell phones can store and reveal 
highly personal information, the Court reasoned that “officers 
must generally secure a warrant” before searching the digital 
contents of a cell phone, even when a phone is seized incident to an 
arrest.135  
Significantly, the Riley Court recognized that smartphones 
have the ability to “reconstruct someone’s specific movements 
down to the minute, not only around town but also within a 
particular building.”136 While Riley was not a per se third-party 
information case, it implicated third-party doctrine concerns. 
Specifically, the Court expressed concern about the amount of data 
accessible through the device as well as its geo-tracking 
capabilities.137 While the government argued that procedures can 
be established to protect citizens from the intrusive nature of these 
technologies, the Court emphatically noted that “the Founders did 
not fight a revolution to gain the right to government agency 
protocols.”138 As a result, the privacy concern helped the Court 
                                                                                                     
obtain certain data without a warrant). 
 132. See id. at 2479 (articulating that “today [2014] many of the more than 
90% of American adults who own cell phones keep on their person a digital record 
of nearly every aspect of their lives”). 
 133. See id. at 2489 (describing that cell phones are like minicomputers 
because of their immense storage capacity). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. at 2485 (explaining that warrants would help protect Fourth 
Amendment concerns involved with this highly revealing technology). 
 136. See id. at 2490 (describing how different technologies can reveal a 
significant amount of information). 
 137. See id. (“Data on a cell phone can also reveal where a person has been. 
Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart phones and 
can reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only 
around town but also within a particular building.”). 
 138. Id. at 2491. 
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conclude that law enforcement should seek a specified warrant 
before obtaining a smartphone user’s personalized information.139  
3. CSLI in United States v. Graham 
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones and the Court’s reasoning 
in Riley suggest that changes to the third-party doctrine are 
necessary and imminent. As technology continues to advance, and 
time-specific location information becomes more accurate, courts 
are struggling to keep pace.140  
A more recent Fourth Circuit case illustrates the current 
disagreement over applying the third-party doctrine. United States 
v. Graham141 involved a report of several armed robberies over the 
course of a few weeks.142 Investigating this report, police stopped 
Aaron Graham’s car with passenger Eric Jordon because the car 
and defendants matched witness descriptions from a recent 
robbery.143 The police found a gun in the car. Both Graham and 
Jordan provided police their cell phone numbers.144 Police then 
sought a court order under the Stored Communication Act (SCA), 
which was granted based on “specific and articulable facts”145 
instead of a probable cause warrant. The government wanted to 
use the defendants’ cell phone location information to “more 
conclusively link the [d]efendants”146 to the robberies.  
                                                                                                     
 139. See id. at 2494–95 (stating that the “answer to the question of what police 
must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly 
simple—get a warrant”). 
 140. See Silliman, supra note 6 (emphasizing that technology continues to 
rapidly advance and courts cannot keep applying old law to current technology). 
 141. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(illustrating how the third-party doctrine applied in a case with robberies). 
 142. See id. (stating that this “prosecution arose from a series of six armed 
robberies of several business establishments” occurring from January 17, 2011 to 
February 5, 2011). 
 143. See id. at 339–41 (stating that the car and clothing of the defendants 
matched witness descriptions of the robbers). 
 144. See id. at 340 (explaining the factual circumstances in which the 
defendants were stopped by police). 
 145. See id. at 387 (discussing the police procedure and reasons for applying 
the court order). 
 146. See id. at 386 (showing the government’s motive for using the defendants’ 
cell phone location information). 
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Moving to suppress the cell location information evidence, the 
defendants did not allege that the SCA is prima facie 
unconstitutional, but argued instead that the SCA as applied to 
their circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment.147 They 
stated that the length of time and extent of monitoring without a 
probable cause warrant violated the defendants’ reasonable 
expectation of privacy and should be deemed unconstitutional.148 
By use of a court order, without a probable cause warrant, police 
were able to collect “two hundred and twenty-one days and 
20,235 individual cell site location data points” from the 
defendants’ cell phone location data.149 With this information, the 
government was then able to “place [the defendants] in the vicinity 
of the armed robberies when the robberies had occurred.”150  
The government argued that “by using their cellular phones, 
and thereby voluntarily conveying their approximate location to 
their service provider, the Defendants can claim no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in that data—in other words, the Fourth 
Amendment simply does not apply.”151 The lower court held that 
the defendants’ rights were not violated because the SCA152 
                                                                                                     
 147. See id. at 342 (“Appellants filed a motion to suppress use of the CSLI at 
trial, arguing that the government's acquisition of the records without a warrant 
based on probable cause was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 148. See id. at 407 (describing the defendants’ challenge that the 
government’s use of their CSLI violated their Fourth Amendment protections). 
 149. Id. at 387. 
 150. See id. at 424 (showing how the government placed the defendants in the 
vicinity of the armed robbery). 
 151. See United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388 (2012) (describing 
why the Fourth Amendment does not apply in this case). 
 152. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (1986) (explaining when a court can issue orders 
which allow government entities to receive information from cell phone 
providers). The statute states: 
[A] court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued 
by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue 
only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents 
of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation. In the case of a State governmental authority, such a 
court order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of such State. A court 
issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly 
by the service provider, may quash or modify such order, if the 
information or records requested are unusually voluminous in nature 
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allowed the government to obtain records from the cell providers 
that were kept “in the ordinary course of business.”153 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit “declined to apply the third-
party doctrine” and held that the appellants “have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their long-term CSLI.”154 The Court 
“conclude[d] that the government’s procurement and inspection of 
Appellants’ historical CSLI was a search, and the government 
violated Appellants’ Fourth Amendment rights by engaging in this 
search without first securing a judicial warrant based on probable 
cause.”155 Although the Court found a Fourth Amendment 
violation, the Court also ruled that the CSLI “records were not 
subject to suppression” because the government acted in “good 
faith” applying for “court orders issued under the SCA.”156  
Rehearing the case en banc in 2016, the Fourth Circuit applied 
the third-party doctrine and held that defendants’ Fourth 
Amendment protections were not violated because the 
“Government legally acquired those records.”157 The majority 
opinion seemed to invite the Supreme Court or Congress to change 
the current third-party doctrine as follows: 
The Supreme Court may in the future limit, or even eliminate, 
the third-party doctrine. Congress may act to require a 
warrant for CSLI cell-site location information. But without a 
change in controlling law, we cannot conclude that the 
Government violated the Fourth Amendment in this case.158 
The Fourth Circuit in Graham went on to state that “Supreme 
Court precedent mandates this conclusion.”159 The Supreme 
                                                                                                     
or compliance with such order otherwise would cause an undue burden 
on such provider. 
Id. 
 153. See Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 388–90 (articulating that a Fourth 
Amendment violation had not occurred because the information obtained by 
police was voluntarily submitted to the third parties and held in the ordinary 
course of business). 
 154. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 360 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(discussing the Fourth Circuit’s holding on appeal). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 438 (4th Cir., 2016) 
(explaining the Fourth Circuit’s holding when rehearing the case en banc). 
 158. Id. at 425. 
 159. Id. 
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Court’s mandate, however, may not be so clear. As noted in Part II 
below, there is disagreement in the lower courts as to the exact 
nature of the Supreme Court’s guidance regarding cell phone 
tracking technology and the third-party doctrine.  
Under the SCA, the government must prove “specific and 
articulable facts”160 instead of probable cause to obtain a cell 
phone’s location information. This “specific and articulable facts” 
standard has been criticized by scholars for not being a sufficient 
standard to protect privacy rights.161 Demonstrating the need for 
clarity, several judges in Graham concurred and dissented. In 
Judge Wilkerson’s concurrence, he stated the warrant requirement 
should be considered by Congress.162 Judge Winn dissented and 
Judge Floyd and Judge Thacker dissented in part and concurred 
in part. Judge Winn expressed the following concern:  
A customer buys a cell phone. She turns it on and puts it in her 
pocket. With those acts, says the majority, she has “voluntarily 
conveyed” an unbounded set of personal location data to her 
service provider, all of which is unprotected by the Fourth 
Amendment.163 
Some scholars claim that the basis for Judge Winn’s statement 
is, “[c]ell phone users do not know about the CSLI shared by their 
phones, and they take no discrete action in order to convey it (aside 
from mere use).”164 As a result, it appears that the Graham 
decision “shows the third-party doctrine’s flaw: in its focus on 
categorizing behavior, it does not accurately estimate what society 
today would consider reasonable.”165 Graham needs to be updated 
to “reflect our [society’s] complex and changing relationship with 
                                                                                                     
 160. See id. at 426 (discussing what the government must prove under the 
SCA). 
 161. See Patrick T. Chamberlain, Court Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell 
Site Location Information: The Argument for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745, 1750–52 (2009) (arguing that courts should be required 
to use a probable cause standard instead of a “specific and articulable facts” 
standard before allowing either historical or real-time CSLI to be disclosed). 
 162. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 435, 438–39 (Wilkerson, J., concurring) (stating 
Congress is better adept to deal with CSLI privacy concerns). 
 163. See id. at 441 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (stating that consumers do not 
voluntarily convey privacy information when they purchase a phone). 
 164. See Acquisition, supra note 3, at 1276 (stating the basis for Judge Winn’s 
statement). 
 165. Id. at 1273. 
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technology.”166 Illustrating this need, courts have reached varying 
conclusions when applying the third-party doctrine.  
II. Into the Bog: Confusion in the Courts 
Many courts have applied the third-party doctrine to similar 
factual circumstances, but have reached different legal 
conclusions. The courts are in a “Serbonian Bog” of confusion.167 
National research conducted by the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) displayed on the map below illustrates how 
different courts have reached different conclusions and 
demonstrates that the precedent is not as established as the 
Fourth Circuit stated in Graham.168 The courts need clear 
guidance when addressing the government’s use of CSLI.  
                                                                                                     
 166. Id. 
 167. See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(showing how different courts apply the third-party doctrine to similar factual 
circumstances). 
 168. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(illustrating the wide variety of third-party doctrine interpretation). 
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Figure 1169 
                                                                                                     
 169. See Cell Phone Location Tracking Lawsby State, AM. C.L. UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/map/cell-phone-location-tracking-laws-state (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2017) (displaying various applications of the warrant requirement under 
the third-party doctrine) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
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A. Distinguishing Between Type of Data and Technology 
Courts disagree about whether a warrant is required for real-
time CSLI. Scholar Teresa Reed explains “the Florida Supreme 
Court ruled in Tracey v. State that the warrantless use of cell site 
location information to track an individual during the course of a 
single day’s car trip violated the Fourth Amendment.”170 
Displaying the contradictory nature of this doctrine, not all courts 
reach the same result. Examining these different conclusions, 
scholars David Oscar Markus and Nathan Freed Wessler explain 
that in one 2012 Sixth Circuit case, the Court held that “the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to shorter-term real-time tracking of a 
cell phone user’s location during a single three-day multi-state trip 
on public highways.”171 Therefore, it is apparent that courts apply 
varying analyses to reach these difficult decisions involving 
technology and privacy.  
Recently, courts have distinguished between the different 
types of content. For example, several courts have held that 
reading email content qualifies as a Fourth Amendment search 
requiring a warrant.172 The Sixth Circuit has stated that even 
though email subscribers voluntarily submit this information to 
third-party internet providers, their reasonable expectation of 
privacy requires the government to get a warrant before obtaining 
this information.173 The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that 
obtaining email address information, IP addresses, and email data, 
does not qualify as a Fourth Amendment search and does not 
require a warrant.174  
                                                                                                     
 170. Teresa Reed, Digital Privacy in the Post-Riley World, Outline, STAN. L. 
SCH. 1–11, 2 (2015). 
 171. See Markus & Wessler, supra note 17, at 1197 n.90 (“The court reserved 
decision about ‘situations where police, using otherwise legal methods, so 
comprehensively track a person’s activities that the very comprehensiveness of 
the tracking is unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.’” (quoting United 
States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012))). 
 172. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating 
that the privacy interests associated with this technology were violated when the 
government compelled the production of emails without first obtaining a warrant 
based on probable cause). 
 173. See id. at 287–88 (describing the difference between content and non-
content privacy concerns with emails). 
 174. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating 
that Fourth Amendment privacy interests were not violated because the manner 
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In United States v. Forrester,175 in the Ninth Circuit, the Court 
noted that “the techniques the government used to monitor the 
defendant’s “email and internet activity,” including IP addresses 
and amount of data transmitted does violate the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment protections.176 Differentiating between the 
privacy expectations in the use of these different and evolving 
modern technologies may be difficult because the third-party 
doctrine has remained static.177  
B. Federal Magistrate Discretion 
As a result of different courts reaching different conclusions 
and attempting to distinguish between technologies, one federal 
circuit reasoned that federal magistrate judges should have 
discretion to decide whether a warrant is required on a case-by-
case basis for CSLI requests.178 The Third Circuit has stated that 
magistrates have the discretion to issue these court orders on a 
“lesser”179 standard than probable cause, but can also “require a 
warrant showing probable cause.”180 The Third Circuit stated that 
this power should be used “sparingly.”181 As a result, courts often 
employ the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis which leads 
to differing results.182 As noted, the reasonable expectation of 
                                                                                                     
in which the information was revealed was similar to the use of a pen register). 
 175. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 176. Id. at 510–13. 
 177. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of The Fourth Amendment, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 311, 311–12 (2011) (emphasizing that Fourth Amendment issues 
continue to confuse courts as technology develops). 
 178. See Markus & Wessler, supra note 17, at 1198 (discussing the various 
approaches different circuits use when evaluating the constitutionality of CSLI 
searches (citing In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010))). 
 179. In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n 
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 180. Id. at 318. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Markus & Wessler, supra note 17, at 1202 (arguing that more courts 
should use the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis when determining if the 
Fourth Amendment requires the government to obtain a search warrant before 
obtaining a consumer’s cell-site location). 
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privacy analysis has created confusion and disagreement among 
the circuits.  
C. Different Reasoning; Similar Results 
The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,183 and Eleventh Circuits have 
upheld the government’s collection of defendant’s CSLI without a 
warrant.184 Even when circuits reach the same conclusion, they 
often offer significantly different justifications. For example, the 
Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant “voluntarily” submits her 
location information to the cellular service provider, therefore 
allowing police to obtain it from the cellular company without a 
warrant.185 While the Eleventh Circuit agrees to the extent that 
police do not need a probable cause warrant to collect this location 
information, that Court has held that this information is not 
voluntarily conveyed.186  
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Skinner187 and in United 
States v. Carpenter188 opined that law enforcement does not violate 
Fourth Amendment protections when obtaining CSLI without a 
probable cause warrant.189 Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit 
                                                                                                     
 183. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(suggesting that this holding may be unstable in the Sixth Circuit). 
 184. See Porter, supra note 3, at 1782–83 (discussing how courts have 
analyzed the third-party doctrine (citing United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 
880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500–01 (11th Cir. 
2015) (en banc), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015); In re Historical Cell Site Data, 
724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013); In re United States for an Order Directing a 
Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 
313 (3d Cir. 2010))). 
 185. See Porter, supra note 3, at 1798–99 (evaluating different reasons for 
upholding the third-party doctrine (citing In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 
600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013))). 
 186. Id. at 1798 (clarifying the different conclusion reached by the Eleventh 
Circuit (citing United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500–01 (11th Cir.) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015))). 
 187. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 188. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 189. See Skinner, 690 F.3d at 774 (stating that the Constitution does not 
provide protections for the defendant’s “erroneous expectations” of privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment associated with modern technology); see also id. at 887–
88 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the CSLI collected by the cellular carrier in 
this case is “unprotected” by the Fourth Amendment). 
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recently stated in United States v. Davis190 that because the 
government is required under the SCA to prove specific and 
articulable facts before a court order is issued, any expectation of 
privacy the defendant may have regarding his CSLI is “not 
justifiable.”191 Agreeing with the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh 
Circuit explained as follows:  
Cell users know that they must transmit signals to cell towers 
within range, that the cell tower functions as the equipment 
that connects the calls, that users when making or receiving 
calls are necessarily conveying or exposing to their service 
provider their general location within that cell tower’s range, 
and that cell phone companies make records of cell-tower 
usage.192  
Adopting a different standard than the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth 
Circuit has taken the position that the courts do not have 
“discretion” to deny the government a court order for CSLI as long 
as the government has complied with the “specified and 
articulable” facts standard noted in SCA § 2703.193  
Adding to the varying analyses among the circuits, the Third 
Circuit has held that law enforcement may obtain CSLI from third-
party providers, not based on the third-party doctrine, but rather 
based on the “public disclosure doctrine.”194 The public disclosure 
doctrine suggests that law enforcement is justified in obtaining 
location-based cell phone information because this technology 
tracks “voluntary movements that are susceptible to visual 
surveillance” similar to those on a public street or highway.195 
Under this doctrine, police are treated as ordinary citizens and 
may track the public movements of an individual without violating 
                                                                                                     
 190. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 191. Id. at 511. 
 192. Id. 
 193. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2703; see In re the United States for Historical Cell Site 
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (stating that this standard is the “proper 
framework” for evaluating privacy concerns associated with CSLI). 
 194. See Bedi, supra note 14, at 517 (explaining that the Third Circuit used a 
different analysis than other courts, but reached the same conclusion about CSLI 
obtained without a probable cause warrant (citing In re Application of the United 
States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose 
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010))). 
 195. See id. at 521 (explaining the analysis of and justification for the public 
disclosure doctrine). 
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Fourth Amendment protections.196 Some scholars suggest that at 
least in one case, if the Third Circuit used the third-party doctrine 
instead of the public disclosure analysis, the Court might have 
required a warrant to obtain location-based information.197 The 
Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion, 
but based their decisions on different doctrines. 
D. The Case for a Probable Cause Warrant 
Numerous courts reject the Fifth Circuit’s position which 
limits judicial discretion. In the Seventh Circuit, a District Court 
in Indiana denied the government’s SCA §2703 request for 
“location-based services”198 revealing CSLI information. 
Specifically, the Court opined that seeking this information 
requires a “probable cause” standard.199 Contrary to the Fifth 
Circuit’s approach, a Seventh Circuit District Court also asserted 
that CSLI information the government requested was 
“unobtainable absent a warrant.”200  
Patrick Chamberlain examined a 2008 Western District of 
Pennsylvania case which held that probable cause is the proper 
standard when determining whether to allow the government to 
view customers’ cell site location information.201 In 2014, the First 
Circuit of Massachusetts Court concluded that suspects have an 
objective expectation of privacy in their CSLI and therefore, police 
should be required to obtain a warrant before gathering this 
                                                                                                     
 196. See id. at 521–22 (analyzing how the public disclosure doctrine relates to 
the third-party doctrine and Fourth Amendment concerns with modern 
technology). 
 197. See id. at 517 (suggesting that the Third Circuit would have reached a 
different conclusion if it did not focus on the public disclosure doctrine (citing In 
re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010))). 
 198. In re United States for an Order: Authorizing the Installation & Use of 
a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, Nos. 1:06-MC-6, 1:06-MC-7, at 3 (N.D. 
Ind. 2006). 
 199. Id. at 13–14. 
 200. Id. at 3–4. 
 201. See Chamberlain, supra note 161, at 1750 (explaining that the District 
Court rejected the more general “specific and articulable facts” standard (citing 
In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to 
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 586 (W.D. Pa. 2008))). 
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potentially incriminating and revealing information.202 While the 
defendant’s motion to suppress CSLI evidence was eventually 
vacated, one Judge opined that “[a] person obtains a cellular 
telephone for the purpose of making and receiving telephone calls, 
not to permit the telephone company or another third-party to 
track the user’s location when the person is not using the 
telephone.”203 
III. Out of the Bog; Proposed Solutions 
 The proposed solutions to the problem of how to modernize 
the third-party doctrine span “the ideological spectrum.”204 This 
Note proposes that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
government to obtain a probable cause warrant to acquire CSLI 
data.205  
A. Third-Party Search Exception 
Akhil Amar (Amar) suggests that the Fourth Amendment and 
Warrant Clauses are separate and should not be read together.206 
Lucas Issacharoff (Issacharoff) and Kyle Wirshba (Wirshba) 
explain that using Amar’s approach, another way to reexamine the 
                                                                                                     
 202. See generally Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846 (Mass. 2014) 
(granting defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress CSLI evidence), rev’d, 
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 868 (Mass. 2014) (vacating 
defendant’s motion to suppress). 
 203. See Augustine, 4 N.E.3d at 872 (Gants, J., dissenting) (asserting that the 
third-party doctrine should apply to telephone toll records as well as CSLI). 
 204. Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party 
Doctrine, 100 MINN. L. REV. 985, 997 (2016). 
 205. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2–70.3 (2015) (requiring the government to 
obtain a warrant to collect real-time CSLI tracking from third-parties under 
Virginia law). While this statute provides law enforcement possible guidance for 
the third-party doctrine, to provide consistent Fourth Amendment privacy 
protections the government should also be required to obtain a warrant before 
collecting historical CSLI. 
 206. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 757, 761 (1994) (stating that the words of the Fourth Amendment and the 
Warrant Clause “do not require warrants, even presumptively, for searches and 
seizures. They do not require probable cause for all searches and seizures without 
warrants”). 
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third-party doctrine would be to rely on “a single inquiry into 
reasonableness.”207 The Fourth Amendment analysis under this 
proposition focuses on whether the law enforcement tactics were 
reasonable, and places less emphasis on the warrant and probable 
cause aspect of the analysis.208 As Issacharoff and Wirshba admit, 
courts and scholars suggest that focusing only on reasonableness 
would too often create “an occasion for constitutional review.”209  
As a result, Issacharoff and Wirshba claim that “third-party 
searches are better characterized as a new type of warrant 
exception than as either a search subject to the warrant and 
probable cause requirements or a non-search unregulated by the 
Fourth Amendment.”210 Accordingly, they propose that courts 
should “recognize third party searches as another exception to the 
warrant requirement, and accordingly craft a reasonableness test 
to gauge when third party searches are constitutionally 
appropriate.”211 Arguing that in third-party doctrine cases a 
probable cause requirement “should not attach by default,” these 
scholars opine that “the constitutional imposition of a warrant 
requirement would both overprotect information in which 
individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy and unduly 
hamper law enforcement interests.”212 Rather, third party 
searches should be governed by, but not solely reliant on, the 
Reasonableness Clause.  
Discussing reasonableness, Issacharoff and Wirshba appear to 
disagree with Amar’s focus on the “kitchen sink reasonableness 
inquiry in every case.”213 Rather Issacharoff and Wirshba argue 
that courts should adopt Chief Justice Warren’s approach in Terry 
                                                                                                     
 207. Issacharoff & Wirshba, supra note 204, at 1009. 
 208. See id. at 1009 (“The core of the Fourth Amendment, as we have seen, is 
neither a warrant nor probable cause, but reasonableness.” (quoting Akhil Reed 
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 802 (1994))). 
 209. See id. at 1011 (arguing that reliance on this factor would “conver[t] the 
fourth amendment into one immense Rorschach blot” (citing Atwater v. City of 
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the 
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 393 (1974))). 
 210. Id. at 986. 
 211. Id. at 1012. 
 212. Issacharoff & Wirshba, supra note 204, at 1012. 
 213. Id. at 1029 (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 761 (1994)). 
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v. Ohio214 as a model for third-party doctrinal analysis. Terry 
involved a law enforcement officer stopping and frisking a 
citizen.215 The Court balanced the government’s interest against 
the individual’s interest.216 Considering the validity of a stop and 
frisk, the new test the Court considered asked “whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted 
in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”217 In 
Terry, this reasonably prudent man was the law enforcement 
officer.218  
Attempting to create a single test that law enforcement could 
apply in the field and courts could easily adopt, the Terry Court did 
not initially focus its analysis on the specific facts of the case. 
Instead, it created a “general proposition” of balancing the risks 
associated with the search.219  
Because some scholars argue that citizens have a diminished 
expectation of privacy with modern technology, courts considering 
the third-party doctrine should focus on law enforcement’s 
reasonableness in conducting the search. As a result, instead of 
examining “total quantity of information” or “types of third party 
information,” it is suggested that under this Terry approach courts 
should “take a step back and conduct a one-time balancing of the 
reasonableness of government access to third party material ‘as a 
general proposition.’”220  
Under this framework, it is suggested that “[t]he Terry Court’s 
move from a case-by-case balancing to a uniform standard can be 
used to create an equally administrable standard for third party 
materials.”221 This reasonable suspicion test for third party 
                                                                                                     
 214. Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 
(1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174–76 (1949); Stacey v. Emery, 
97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878)). 
 215. Id. at 1872–73. 
 216. Id. at 1879. 
 217. Id. at 1883. 
 218. See id. (“The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is 
armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances 
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”). 
 219. Id. at 1879 (citing Camara v. Mun. Ct. 387, U.S. 523, 534–35) (1967)). 
 220. Id. at 1034. 
 221. Id. at 1033. 
206 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 171 (2017) 
searches, some scholars argue, is a practical middle ground.222 
Similar to Terry, in third party situations, “officers should be able 
to point to specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable 
suspicion that the third party search will turn up information 
relevant to an ongoing investigation, and searches should be 
reasonable in scope.”223 While opponents of a warrant requirement 
argue that consumers lack an expectation of privacy in the 
information submitted to their cellular provider,224 even 
proponents of this theory admit that the expectation of privacy is 
not totally diminished.225  
Many judges and scholars agree that cell phone consumers 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy. As Justice Marshall and 
Justice Brennan have noted, if there is no practical real alternative 
to an action, the action should not be considered voluntary.226 
Richard Epstein (Epstein) states that this diminished expectation 
of privacy is not assumed.227 Epstein argues that the Fourth 
Amendment should require a balancing of interests to determine 
the reasonableness of the privacy component of a particular case. 
He explains that:  
In essence the task is finding that set of rules which, when laid 
down generally, produces the best mix of privacy and security that 
can be obtained in light of the limited available knowledge, taking 
into account that the Fourth Amendment protects not only the 
guilty, but also innocent persons who may have been swept into a 
search.228 
Responding to Epstein’s assertion of a cost-benefit test for 
advanced technologies, Orin Kerr (Kerr) suggests that this 
                                                                                                     
 222. Id. at 1030–31. 
 223. Id. at 1036. 
 224. See Porter, supra note 3, at 1789 (articulating the argument that 
customers lack a reasonable expectation of privacy to this information). 
 225. See Issacharoff & Wirshba, supra note 204, at 1021 (explaining that this 
expectation of privacy is “diminished, though not nonexistent”). 
 226. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Brennan, J., & 
Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that consumers do not voluntarily convey this 
privacy information). 
 227. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Privacy the Third Hand: Lessons from 
the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH L. J. 1199 (2009) 
(discussing the assumption of the risk with CSLI is forced on individuals). 
 228. Id. at 1202. 
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balancing approach has already been used by courts.229 
Furthermore, Kerr states that Epstein’s argument significantly 
differs from his because Epstein does not subscribe to an “all or 
nothing”230 approach to the Fourth Amendment. Kerr believes that 
police action either is or is not a search.231 If it is a search, then it 
requires a probable cause warrant.232  
Kerr defends the advantages of the third-party doctrine which 
consist of “technological neutrality of Fourth Amendment rules”233 
and provides “ex ante clarity.”234 While Kerr disagrees with many 
scholars’ arguments, he recognizes that many authors and courts 
suggest that a significant change to the third-party doctrine is 
necessary. Kerr explains that the third-party doctrine inquiry 
should be a fact specific determination of whether the person acted 
reasonably and had a reasonable expectation of privacy.235 He 
explains that “[t]his is a prospective inquiry from the standpoint of 
the suspect: The question is whether a reasonable person in the 
suspect’s situation would expect the information to be widely 
disseminated.”236  
Given Kerr’s argument about reasonableness, Justice Alito’s 
concurrence in Jones is significant. Justice Alito stated that 
advancing technology may change society’s expectations of 
privacy.237 If there is no realistic alternative to using a technology, 
and a particular technology is necessary to function in modern 
society, then Justice Alito is correct that this information is not 
“voluntarily” disclosed to third parties. Suggesting that society has 
                                                                                                     
 229. See Orin S. Kerr, Defending the Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to 
Epstein and Murphy, 24 BERKELEY TECH L. J. 1229, 1230 (2009) [hereinafter Kerr, 
Defending] (discussing the balancing analysis many courts already use). 
 230. Id. at 1232. 
 231. Id. (articulating his all-or-nothing standard to Fourth Amendment law). 
 232. See id. (discussing the general implications of a police search). 
 233. Id. at 1231 (stating that balancing the interests of a prisoner’s privacy in 
her cell and society’s interest, the interests of society outweigh the prisoner’s 
(citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984))). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 561, 583 (2009) (evaluating alternatives to replace the third-party doctrine). 
 236. Id. 
 237. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (stating that society’s reasonable expectation of privacy may change 
with modern location tracking technology). 
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already recognized a heightened expectation of privacy because of 
the pervasive use of technology, many scholars suggest that society 
may already have an objective expectation of privacy for location 
emitting devices, such as cell phones.238 If society has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, then perhaps a more persuasive 
modification to the third-party doctrine is to require a probable 
cause warrant for CSLI. 
B. Probable Cause Requirement for Third-Party Searches 
Many scholars argue that the pervasive use and ubiquitous 
existence of current technologies mandate more protection than a 
court order based on specific and articulable facts. Scholars 
Priscilla J. Smith, Nabiha Syed, David Thaw, and Albert Wong 
suggest the following:  
[The] type and scope of information collected by prolonged 
automated GPS surveillance enables governments to monitor a 
person’s political associations, their medical conditions and 
their amorous interests, in a way that invades their privacy and 
chills expression of other fundamental rights.239 
As a result of the nature of this technology, law enforcement 
should be required to obtain warrants “to prevent abuse” of Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections.240 Without a warrant, prolonged 
GPS surveillance disturbs society’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy and “chills the exercise of core constitutional rights.”241 
These scholars argue that the continuous monitoring of GPS 
information presents a different question than the Court’s 
                                                                                                     
 238. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (holding that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their personal cell phones because of the amount of personal information they 
contain). 
 239. Priscilla Smith et al., When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless 
Use of GPS Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right 
Against Unreasonable Searches, 121 YALE L. J. 1, 6 (2011) [hereinafter When 
Machines Are Watching] http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1001&context=ylas (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 240. Id. at 220–21. 
 241. Id. at 221. 
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precedent of Knotts242 which involved beeper technology.243 GPS 
technology not only continuously provides location information, 
but unlike previous beeper technology, it does not require officers 
to follow the suspect.244 Furthermore, GPS is more intrusive 
because these devices can “store” location information and 
transmit this information to a variety of parties, revealing common 
patterns, preferences, and more intrusive information than a 
traditional beeper.245  
Additionally, as the Court noted in Kyllo,246 a significant factor 
for Courts to consider is whether the technology is in “general 
public use.”247 While GPS technology is embedded in all 
smartphones today, the use of “GPS surveillance technology, 
however, is not accepted by the public.” "248 Because cell phones 
may have the capacity to track an individual’s movements down to 
a few feet,249 it seems credible that this surveillance location 
information infringes on a reasonable expectation of privacy. Some 
scholars argue that, “[i]n fact, Americans become uncomfortable 
with GPS when there is even a slight loss of user-control.”250 
While there are many proposed iterations of the third-party 
doctrine, there is one consistent, overriding factor: with the 
                                                                                                     
 242. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 243. See id. (discussing the relationship between beeper technology and 
Fourth Amendment privacy concerns”). 
 244. When Machines Are Watching, supra note 239, at 21. 
 245. Id. at 23. 
 246. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 247. Id. at 34. 
 248. When Machines Are Watching, supra note 239, at 24. 
 249. See Jonathan Rodriguez, Uptick in Police Surveillance Tech Sparks New 
Opportunity, WALL ST. DAILY (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.wallstreetdaily.com 
/2017/02/16/uptick-police-surveillance-tech-sparks-new-opportunity/ (discussing 
the recent trend of and accuracy associated with the government using cell phone 
location tracking technology) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice); see also Robinson Meyer, How the Government Surveils 
Cellphones: A Primer, ATLANTIC (Sep. 11, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
technology/archive/2015/09/how-the-government-surveils-cell-phones-a-
primer/404818/ (explaining the precision of different CSLI technologies the 
government uses) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 250. When Machines Are Watching, supra note 239, at 24, 24 n.35 (stating 
that “GPS technology is also used by some private and government employers to 
ensure job performance and service delivery”). 
210 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 171 (2017) 
amount of tracking information that a smartphone can capture, 
hold, and reveal, people in modern society have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in this information. This expectation should 
require a higher and clearer standard than specific and articulable 
facts before such detailed personal information is turned over to 
law enforcement. As some argue, if there is not a warrant 
requirement, there is an “unprecedented” potential for abuse of 
privacy protections.251 Recently, legislation has been introduced in 
Congress to address the issue of government searches of cell phone 
location information.  
C. Legislative Solution 
As several courts have suggested, given how quickly 
technology changes, the legislature may be in the best position to 
modernize the third-party doctrine. In Riley, Justice Alito 
suggested that perhaps Congress or state legislatures should 
balance the law enforcement interests and citizens’ Constitutional 
protections to “enact legislation that draws reasonable distinctions 
based on categories of information or perhaps other variables.”252 
Justice Alito also emphasized that the “legislatures, elected by the 
people, are in a better position than we are to assess and respond 
to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost 
certainly will take place in the future” about this constantly 
evolving technology.253 
Legislation addressing Fourth Amendment privacy concerns 
in government searches of location-based technology was re-
introduced in January 2015 by Congressman Jason Chaffetz (R) 
from Utah and Senator Ron Wyden (D) from Oregon.254 This bi-
partisan support for legislation is titled the Geo-location Privacy 
and Surveillance Act (GPS Act).255 It seeks to require a consumer’s 
express consent before location information may be revealed.256 
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Notably, there are several exceptions to the consent requirement, 
including theft or fraud, emergency situations, and most notably, 
a warrant exception.257 The GPS Act states that, “[a] governmental 
entity may intercept geolocation information or require the 
disclosure by a provider of a covered service of geo-location 
information only pursuant to a warrant issued using the 
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure” 
or in the “or the Foreign Intelligence 12 Surveillance Act of 1978 
(50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.)”258 The Act is structured in the same 
manner as the federal wiretapping statue and is intended to be 
applied in a similar manner.259  
IV. Conclusion 
Technology has advanced to the point where cell phone 
tracking can sometimes locate a phone’s precise location within 
several feet.260 Most consumers would probably be shocked to learn 
that, pursuant to the third-party doctrine, cell phone carriers can 
legally turn over CSLI to law enforcement without a probable 
cause warrant. The concept that consumers somehow voluntarily 
consent to the disclosure of such highly detailed personal 
information when they sign up for cell phone service defies the 
reality of modern society. Citizens’ reasonable Fourth Amendment 
privacy expectations in the use of cell phones should be protected.  
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones, the Court’s decision in 
Riley, and the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in Graham, offer 
an opportunity to pursue Justice Sotomayor’s suggestion that it is 
time to reconsider the third-party doctrine. Using Jones and Riley, 
the Supreme Court now has the opportunity to clarify the 
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confusion created by the application of outdated laws to modern 
technology.261  
All the Justices’ positions in Jones suggest that a warrant is 
preferable. A probable cause warrant requirement for CSLI would 
allow the courts to keep up with constantly evolving cell phone 
tracking technology. Analogous to the impact of the Miranda 
warning requirement, requiring a warrant for CSLI would remove 
the legal confusion in this area. Such a requirement would also 
assist law enforcement and ensure citizens’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy.  
The Riley decision is especially helpful in analyzing privacy 
issues that arise from the use of cell phones. Riley, a unanimous 
decision, specifically addressed what police must do before 
searching a cell phone seized incident to arrest.262 The United 
States Supreme Court should extend its analysis in Riley to the 
government’s collection of data created by the use of a cell phone. 
The path out of the Bog is clear: “get a warrant.”263 
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